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 Government business shall be conducted in a manner above reproach and, except as authorized by statute or 
regulation, with complete impartiality and with preferential treatment for none. Transactions relating to the ex-
penditure of public funds require the highest degree of public trust and an impeccable standard of conduct. 
This policy, articulated in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),1 makes clear that the govern-ment procurement process demands the highest commitment to ethical and unbiased conduct. 
To ensure that the individuals involved in the procurement process adhere to these standards, gov-
ernment entities in nearly all jurisdictions around the world have enacted codes of conduct, ethical 
restrictions, and anti-corruption laws designed to protect the integrity of government and ensure that 
government officials2 act impartially and do not give preferential treatment to any private organiza-
tion or individual.3 To further these goals, most jurisdictions have enacted restrictions on the gifts and 
hospitality4 that government officials may accept 
from individuals and organizations that sell goods 
and services to the government. 
 While gifts and hospitality play an important 
role in facilitating and strengthening business 
relationships in the private sector, in the public 
sector, common business courtesies may ap-
pear as an attempt to influence a government 
official and the procurement process. This con-
cern is not unfounded. Most public corruption 
cases involving government contractors include 
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references to the offering of lavish gifts, meals, 
travel, or entertainment to government officials. 
Moreover, nearly all governmental bodies have 
enacted ethical restrictions that limit the gifts 
and hospitality that may be accepted by govern-
ment officials—even in the absence of intent to 
influence a government official. Indeed, these 
restrictions are often even more stringent for 
government procurement officials.
 Ethics and anti-corruption laws vary dramati-
cally depending on the jurisdiction. Consequently, 
determining the applicable rules for a particular 
government entity can be incredibly challenging. 
To assist contractors with this process, Part I of 
this Briefing PaPer provides an overview of the laws 
and policies that restrict the offering or giving of 
gifts and hospitality to government officials. Part II 
addresses the severe consequences that may result 
when contractors offer or give gifts and hospitality to 
influence an official action. Part III offers practical 
suggestions regarding the policies and procedures 
that a government contractor may implement to 
reduce the risk of violating these laws. 
Part I: Government Ethics Restrictions On 
Gifts & Hospitality 
 All individuals or companies that interact with 
government officials must be aware of the strict 
ethics rules that often govern the parties’ interac-
tions. These rules seek to ensure that government 
officials perform their duties impartially and do 
not wrongfully use their public positions for pri-
vate gain. Most of the laws target the relationship 
between contractors and government officials 
to ensure that the parties’ interactions are free 
from corruption or from even the appearance of 
impropriety. Most jurisdictions, whether in the 
United States or abroad, have enacted laws or 
requirements that restrict the gifts and hospital-
ity that government contractors may provide to 
government officials. 
 Contractors that work in a variety of jurisdic-
tions have the unenviable task of determining the 
ethics rules applicable to the government officials 
in each specific jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the 
ethics rules vary dramatically depending on the 
jurisdiction, making the task even more difficult 
for contractor compliance officers and contrac-
tor employees who interact with government 
officials. While some companies simplify this 
task with across-the-board prohibitions against 
giving gifts or hospitality to government officials, 
other contractors consider a flat prohibition to 
be unworkable (or unrealistic). 
 ■ U.S. Federal Ethics Requirements
 The U.S. Federal Government has strict rules 
prohibiting government officials from accepting 
gifts, hospitality, and other business courtesies 
that are common in the private sector. As a result, 
companies that do business with the Federal Gov-
ernment must be aware of and provide training to 
their employees regarding federal ethics restric-
tions. While the federal gift restrictions focus exclu-
sively on government officials, contractors must be 
cognizant of the requirements and vigilant about 
compliance. Indeed, offering a prohibited gift or 
hospitality to a government official is not only im-
proper, but demonstrates a lack of sophistication 
regarding government protocols—a misstep that 
could not only place the government official in an 
awkward position, but raises questions about the 
contractor’s integrity and responsibility.5 
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do not constitute a meal), plaques, discounts 
available to the public, and honorary degrees.12 
The broad definition of “gift” also includes many 
business courtesies that are quite common in the 
private sector, such as meals, entertainment and 
transportation.13 For companies entering the 
public procurement market, these restrictions 
are often the most jarring. 
 If an item is not excluded from the definition 
of “gift,” it is likely prohibited unless a limited 
exception applies. Notably, the exceptions are 
not broad loopholes that may be exploited to ply 
government officials with lavish meals and vaca-
tions. They are purposefully narrow and designed 
to balance the need to protect the government 
with the realities of contemporary business in-
teractions. Unless a gift falls neatly within one 
of the following exclusions or exceptions, “the 
safest course of action is to assume the gift is 
prohibited.”14 
 (1) The “20/50 Rule”—A contractor may offer 
noncash gifts with an aggregate market value of 
$20 or less per occasion, so long as the aggregate 
market value of the gifts does not exceed $50 in 
a calendar year.15 The monetary limit applies to 
an entire organization, not its individual employ-
ees.16 Consequently, a contractor must ensure 
that it accurately tracks the gifts and hospitality 
provided to each government official to ensure 
that the company does not exceed the cap. In 
addition, contractors cannot offer or give gifts 
or hospitality that exceed the cap by allowing 
the government official to pay the difference 
between the fair market value of the item and 
the gift cap. Thus, for example, a contractor may 
not buy a government official’s lunch, valued at 
$40, even if the government official pays the $20 
difference.17
 (2) Gifts Based on a Personal Relationship—An 
individual employee of a government contractor 
may provide a gift to a government official if it is 
clear that the gift is “motivated by a family rela-
tionship or personal friendship rather than the 
position of the employee.”18 To qualify for this 
exception, several factors are relevant, including 
who paid for the gift, the origin of the friendship, 
and the history of gift-giving between the parties. 
The OGE has made clear in its guidance that all 
of the factors must demonstrate that the gifts and 
 The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) 
maintains a user-friendly website that summa-
rizes the relevant laws and provides detailed 
guidance and training materials about the ethics 
restrictions applicable to Federal Government 
officials.6 The rules relating to gifts from outside 
sources reflect concerns regarding gifts provided 
by contractors or entities that do business with 
or seek an official action from the government. 
They are designed to guard against the mere 
appearance that a Federal Government official 
is providing favorable treatment in exchange 
for the gifts or hospitality. In recent decades, 
the complex federal ethics requirements have 
been further complicated by the continued rise 
in government outsourcing. Indeed, compli-
ance with ethics requirements has become even 
more challenging as an increasing number of 
contractor-employees work side-by-side with 
government officials in government agencies. 
Common office traditions, such as birthdays, 
retirement celebrations, and holiday parties, 
create unique ethical issues due to an increas-
ingly blended workforce.7
 Although the policies underlying federal gift 
restrictions are straightforward, the rules are 
fairly complicated and riddled with exceptions 
and nuance. As a general rule, government 
employees are prohibited from (directly or in-
directly) soliciting or accepting “gifts” (1) from 
a “prohibited source” or (2) given because of 
the employee’s official position.8 Companies 
that contract with (or seek to contract with) the 
Federal Government fall within the definition 
of “prohibited source,” which includes persons 
or organizations who (a) seek an official action 
or to do business with the federal employee’s 
agency, (b) conduct business or activities with 
or are regulated by the employee’s agency, or 
(c) have interests that may be affected by the 
performance or nonperformance of the federal 
employee’s official duties.9 A gift is deemed to 
be given because of a Federal Government em-
ployee’s official position if a gift would not have 
been offered or given if the employee was not 
working for the government.10 
 The definition of “gift” includes hospitality, 
as well as any other item of monetary value.11 
Excluded from this definition are items of little 
intrinsic value, such as modest refreshments (that 
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hospitality were motivated by the personal friend-
ship, not the government official’s position. The 
OGE is particularly suspicious of “friendships” that 
have developed on the job or gifts that have been 
purchased with company funds.19 
 (3) Gifts From a Spouse’s Employer—Similar to 
the previous exception, gifts or hospitality may 
be extended to a government official if it is 
based on a spousal relationship. For example, 
if a contractor-employee is married to a govern-
ment official, under limited circumstances, the 
contractor may provide meals, lodging, trans-
portation and other benefits if offered because 
of the spousal relationship—not because of the 
government official’s position.20 Thus, if a gov-
ernment contractor hosts a lavish holiday party 
for all employees and their significant others, 
the government official may attend as long as the 
invitation is extended to all significant others.
 (4) Gifts in Connection with Bona Fide Employment 
Discussions—If a government contractor wants 
to engage in bona fide employment discussions 
with a government official, it may provide meals, 
transportation, and lodging in connection with 
the discussions as long as the government official 
has first complied with the government ethics 
requirements applicable to employment discus-
sions.21 Although beyond the scope of this Briefing 
PaPer, contractors must keep in mind that the 
rules relating to employment discussions with 
government officials are complex and require 
significant caution.22 Consequently, before a 
government contractor considers offering gifts or 
hospitality under this exception, it is critical that 
it complies with all other requirements relating 
to employment discussions.23 
 (5) Widely Attended Gatherings—Government con-
tractors may generally offer government officials 
free attendance at a widely attended gathering as 
long as the event is legitimately widely attended 
and attendance by the government official is in 
the agency’s interest (a determination made by the 
agency, not the contractor).24 “Free attendance” 
is defined as including a waiver of all or part of 
the fees associated with the conference, including 
“food, refreshments, entertainment, instruction 
and materials furnished to all attendees as an 
integral part of the event.”25 It does not include 
expenses for transportation and lodging or for 
“entertainment collateral to the event, or meals 
taken other than in a group setting with all other 
attendees.”26 This is a complicated exception 
and contractors should be certain that the event 
qualifies as a widely attended gathering before 
offering free attendance to a government official.
 Even if one of the aforementioned exclusions 
applies, contractors should not offer gifts so fre-
quently that a reasonable person may believe that 
they are being offered for an improper purpose. 
Indeed, the applicable regulations expressly state: 
“it is never inappropriate and frequently prudent for 
an employee to decline a gift offered by a prohib-
ited source or because of his official position.”27 A 
contractor analyzing the frequency of its gift-giving 
should consider the following: if you saw a competi-
tor doing this, would you think it was an attempt to 
obtain an unfair competitive advantage? If so, then 
the gift or hospitality should not be extended. 
 There are several other key areas of gift and 
hospitality compliance that are of particular rel-
evance to government contractors. For example, 
contractors may find themselves in a position 
where they may be able to offer transportation 
to a government official. It is critical that con-
tractors understand that the definition of “gift” 
for purposes of the federal ethics rules expressly 
includes “transportation” (which also includes 
“local travel”).28 The line between permissible 
and impermissible transportation depends on the 
purpose of the transportation. If transportation is 
offered by the contractor in connection with the 
government official’s duties, it is deemed a gift 
to the agency and, therefore, may be offered.29 
Conversely, if the transportation is for the “per-
sonal benefit” of the government official, it is a 
“gift” and may not be provided unless it qualifies 
under one of the above-mentioned exceptions.30 
 Because this is a common occurrence, the 
OGE’s examples are instructive to this analysis.31 
A contractor providing “travel between two work 
sites during official site visits” does not implicate 
ethics restrictions because the benefit is to the 
agency. On the other hand, if a “contractor offers 
to allow [a government official] to use the con-
tractor’s shuttle bus as part of his daily commute 
to the office,” it would benefit the government 
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official personally and would constitute a gift. 
The latter would only be permitted if it met an 
exception (for example, if the shuttle ride was 
valued at less than $20).32 
 Government contractors that consider offering 
gifts or hospitality to a government official must 
keep in mind that the restrictions apply not only to 
gifts provided directly to the government official, 
but also to those provided indirectly. Examples 
of indirect gifts that trigger the federal ethics 
rules include (a) gifts given with the government 
employee’s knowledge and consent to a member 
of his immediate family (or dependent relative) 
because of the family member’s relationship to 
the government official or (b) given to any other 
person or organization (including charities) “on 
the basis of designation, recommendation, or 
other specification” by the government official.33 
This rule prevents outside sources from evading 
gift restrictions by funneling gifts through an 
intermediary or seeking the enrichment of a fam-
ily member (or any other designated person or 
entity) of the government official.34 Contractors 
analyzing their compliance with this require-
ment should keep the following rule of thumb 
in mind: if a gift may not be provided directly 
to the government official without violating the 
ethics restrictions, it may not be offered to or 
through another person or entity. 
 Finally, although the gift restrictions focus ex-
clusively on government officials, contractors may 
face severe consequences for causing or inducing 
a government official to violate the federal gift 
restrictions, such as suspension or debarment or 
other contractual remedies. Moreover, the penal-
ties may be even more severe if it is determined 
that a gift has been offered or given in an attempt 
to obtain a contract or favorable treatment from 
government procurement officials.35 Gifts or 
hospitality offered in an attempt to influence 
government officials are discussed in Section II 
of this Briefing PaPer.
 ■ State & Local Ethics Restrictions
 Many contractors view the federal ethics regime 
as complicated and difficult to navigate. While 
this may be true in certain instances, the federal 
regime is practically a walk in the park compared 
to state and local ethics restrictions. While the 
federal rules are available on a user-friendly 
website (along with detailed and helpful training 
materials), tracking down applicable state and 
local ethics rules, particularly for government 
contractors working in numerous different ju-
risdictions, can be a Herculean task. 
 Any contractor seeking to locate the applicable 
gift and hospitality restrictions in a particular ju-
risdiction will quickly note that they are often very 
difficult to find. Moreover, the restrictions vary 
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, which can 
make compliance with the laws quite challenging. 
In addition, unlike the laws of the federal regime, 
many of the state and local ethics laws focus on 
both government officials and the outside source 
providing the gift, which means that any violation 
will not only harm a contractor’s reputation—it 
could also implicate its bottom line. 
 While it is beyond the scope of this Briefing 
PaPer to summarize the gift and hospitality laws 
of all 50 states, some examples are provided 
below. The National Conference of State Leg-
islatures (NCSL)36 has helpfully grouped state 
ethics laws by certain shared characteristics. It is 
important to note that the examples below are 
designed to highlight the wide variety of general 
gift and hospitality restrictions that a contractor 
may encounter in various states and cities. The 
examples are not, however, a complete summary 
of the restrictions applicable to state or local 
government officials, as many states and cities 
employ more restrictive gift and hospitality laws 
for specific government agencies and officials. 
Moreover, many jurisdictions have enacted re-
strictive gift and hospitality rules for government 
officials involved in the procurement process. 
Given the drastic differences in rules between 
jurisdictions and specific agencies, it is critical 
that government contractors always review the 
rules applicable to each government agency and 
official before extending a gift or hospitality. 
 As noted above, state gift and hospitality restric-
tions vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction. 
For example, some states maintain policies that 
are practically “zero tolerance” when it comes 
to gifts and hospitality (often referred by NCSL 
as “no cup of coffee” states).37 New Jersey, for 
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example, has what has been described as one 
of the strictest ethics regimes in the country. 
Despite its reputation for corruption, the State 
Integrity Project (a partnership of the Center 
for Public Integrity, Global Integrity, and Public 
Radio International)38 ranked New Jersey No. 
1 for transparency and accountability in state 
government because, among other reasons, it has 
the “toughest ethics and anti-corruption laws in 
the nation.”39 
 The New Jersey Uniform Ethics Code states 
that “No State officer or employee or special 
State officer or employee shall accept any gift, 
favor, service or other thing of value related in 
any way to the State official’s public duties.”40 
While there are a few minimal exceptions to this 
policy (i.e., gifts of trivial value or items offered 
under the same terms and conditions as to the 
general public), contractors should assume that 
most things of value are prohibited.41 New Jersey 
also requires contractors to certify compliance 
with the state Conflicts of Interest law,42 which 
contains additional gift and hospitality restrictions, 
and to follow the “guiding principles” outlined 
in the state “Business Ethics Guide.”43 Notably, 
under this law, willfully inducing or attempting to 
induce a state employee to violate the Conflicts of 
Interest law may result in a fine of $500 and/or 
up to six months in prison.44 In addition, unlike 
some ethics regimes in the United States, the New 
Jersey Ethics Commission has been characterized 
as effective in its enforcement of the state’s ethics 
laws.45 
 At the other end of the spectrum are states 
that place no monetary restrictions on the giving 
of gifts and hospitality to government officials. 
These states only prohibit gifts or hospitality that 
are designed to improperly influence an official 
action—a topic discussed in Part II of this Brief-
ing PaPer.46 For example, South Dakota has no 
restrictions on the gifts or hospitality that may 
be provided to a government official. Absent a 
contrary directive from a specific agency or in-
stitution, gift-giving in South Dakota is virtually 
limitless.47
 Other states have similarly permissive gift and 
hospitality rules, but the landscape is chang-
ing. For example, although Virginia has been 
criticized in recent years for its notoriously “lax” 
ethics restrictions,48 recent scandals, like the 
indictment of the former Governor and First 
Lady Bob and Maureen McDonnell for violating 
federal bribery laws, has prompted lawmakers to 
propose “reforms” to the Commonwealth’s eth-
ics laws.49 Specifically, in 2014, Governor Terry 
McAuliffe, who campaigned on a platform that 
included ethics reform, issued an Executive 
Order that imposes a $100 gift cap on executive 
branch officers and employees.50 Notably, the 
Virginia legislature has failed to follow suit with 
similarly restrictive ethics reforms, resulting in 
a legislative proposal that has been described by 
The WashingTon PosT as a bill “so slack it would 
be disingenuous to refer to it as ‘reform.’”51 The 
legislature has proposed a modest $250 cap on 
individual “tangible” gifts to officials and their 
immediate family members—excluding travel, 
meals, entertainment and other “intangibles” 
from the cap.52 Moreover, it places no cap on the 
“cumulative dollar value” of gifts that a legislator 
may accept.53
 Although Virginia’s ethics rules are lax 
compared to many other state and local ethics 
regimes, the gift and hospitality restrictions 
applicable to procurement transactions in the 
Commonwealth are fairly robust. The Virginia 
Public Procurement Act prohibits bidders, of-
ferors, contractors, and subcontractors from 
conferring “upon any public employee hav-
ing official responsibility for a procurement 
transaction any payment, loan, subscription, 
advance, deposit of money, services or anything 
of more than nominal value, present or promised, 
unless consideration of substantially equal or 
greater value is exchanged.”54 Moreover, the 
Commonwealth of Virginia Vendor’s Manual 
provides additional clarification:55
No vendor shall offer any gift, gratuity, favor, 
or advantage to any state employee who exercises 
official procurement responsibility, develops 
procurement requirements, or otherwise influ-
ences procurement decisions. State employees 
may attend vendor-sponsored seminars or trade 
shows where the buying staffs will benefit from 
receiving product information and learning of 
new techniques and trends. Food, drinks, and 
give-away items offered to all participants at such 
functions may be accepted by state employees 
attending.
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 Virginia’s complex and diversified ethics 
regime serves as a warning to contractors that 
the applicable ethics laws may vary dramatically 
depending on the duties and responsibilities of 
the particular government official. 
 Somewhere between the “zero tolerance” states 
and “no limit” states are those states that impose 
monetary thresholds on the gifts and hospitality 
that outside sources may offer to most government 
officials. These are the most common restrictions 
in the United States and are the most similar to 
the Federal Government’s ethics regime (though 
the dollar thresholds vary greatly). Moreover, 
similar to the federal requirements, state and 
local ethics rules are riddled with exclusions and 
exceptions. For example, in Illinois, government 
officials may not accept gifts from prohibited 
sources (i.e., government contractors), nor may 
prohibited sources offer gifts, though the law 
exempts certain items, including any “item or 
items from any one prohibited source during any 
calendar year having a cumulative total value of 
less than $100.”56 In Rhode Island, gifts or other 
things of value are capped at $25 dollars per day 
or $75 per calendar year.57 The State of Wash-
ington’s gift limit is $50 per year, but excludes 
items such as floral arrangements and food and 
beverages consumed at certain events and recep-
tions.58 Although this is just a small sample of state 
gift and hospitality restrictions, it shows that the 
monetary thresholds and applicable exemptions 
vary dramatically from state to state. 
 Assuming a contractor is able to locate the rel-
evant state gift or hospitality restrictions, it must 
also consider whether there are more stringent 
rules applicable to its specific agency customer. 
Similarly, a contractor must also be cognizant of any 
local gift or hospitality restrictions that may govern 
the relationship. For example, in San Francisco, 
city officers or employees may not accept gifts un-
less they are “non-cash gifts worth $25 or less, up 
to 4 times per year” or “gifts of food or drink to 
be shared in office.”59 In Philadelphia, contractors 
are prohibited from offering or giving, among 
other things, gifts, gratuities, favors, invitations, 
food, and drinks to city executive department 
officials and employees and members of boards 
and commissions.60 There are some exclusions 
from the general prohibition, including gifts 
from friends or relatives, widely offered discounts 
or nominal tokens of appreciation, though this 
category of items is quite narrow. Philadelphia 
also requires city employees to report offers of 
prohibited gifts to the city’s Chief Integrity Officer 
and to the Inspector General. As such, gift and 
hospitality restrictions applicable to city officials 
and employees in Philadelphia are actually far 
more restrictive than the requirements applicable 
to state government officials in Pennsylvania.61 
 A contractor may face severe consequences 
for violating state and local gift and hospital-
ity restrictions. For example, in Washington, a 
contractor may be debarred for violating the 
limitation on gifts to state officers or employees.62 
In Virginia, a contractor may be debarred for 
“[c]onferring or offering to confer any gift, gratu-
ity, favor, or advantage, present or future, upon 
any employee of a state agency who exercises any 
‘official responsibility’ for a ‘procurement trans-
action.’…It is not necessary that the offer be accepted 
by the employee, or that the offer be made with intent to 
influence the employee in an official act.”63 Similarly, 
in cities like Philadelphia, offering a prohibited 
gift to a city employee may result in sanctions, 
up to and including debarment.64
 ■ Foreign Ethics Restrictions
 Contractors that do business with governments 
outside of the United States may have the most 
difficult task locating other countries’ gift and 
hospitality restrictions. Not only is it challeng-
ing to locate the ethics laws of a foreign country 
online, some requirements may not be available 
in English. Frustrated by this process, many com-
panies now hire local counsel or use commercial 
services to ensure compliance with all local gift 
and hospitality laws. 
 Many gift and hospitality restrictions in other 
countries are notably less stringent and less 
refined than U.S. federal ethics restrictions. Be-
cause these foreign laws are comparatively newer, 
they are not as well developed or well enforced 
as those in the United States. Although enforce-
ment of these laws may be less than rigorous, it 
is still critical that contractors remain vigilant 
about compliance with these requirements. 
This Briefing PaPer provides several examples 
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of general gift and hospitality restrictions that 
may be found abroad. Contractors should note, 
however, that these examples are not exhaustive 
and the countries listed below may have enacted 
more rigorous gifts and hospitality restrictions 
depending on the particular government agency 
or public official involved.
 In the Philippines, gift and hospitality restric-
tions are fairly broad and restrictive. Gifts and 
hospitality are generally governed by the “Code 
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Of-
ficials and Employees”65 and the Anti-Graft and 
Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 019).66 Section 
7(d) of the Code states that “Public officials and 
employees shall not solicit or accept, directly or 
indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, 
loan or anything of monetary value from any 
person in the course of their official duties or in 
connection with any operation being regulated 
by, or any transaction which may be affected by 
the functions of their office.”67 In addition, the 
implementing rules state that the “propriety or 
impropriety” of a gift will be “determined by its 
value, kinship or relationship between giver and 
receiver and the motivation.”68 The law exempts 
unsolicited gifts of “nominal or insignificant 
value,” gifts from family members, gifts from 
persons that do not have any transactions with 
the government official’s agency, “humanitarian 
and altruistic” donations, and donations from 
other government entities, so long as there is no 
expectation of pecuniary gain or benefit.69 Ad-
ditionally, section 3 of the Philippines Anti-Graft 
and Corrupt Practices Act prohibits, among other 
things, public officials from, directly or indirectly, 
receiving any gift, present or benefit in connec-
tion with a government contract or transaction 
under the public officer’s authority.70 Notably, 
the gift restrictions prohibit the “[r]eceiving 
of any gift” if the value of the gift is “manifestly 
excessive.”71 As the term “manifestly excessive” is 
not defined, contractors should exercise caution 
before extending gifts to government officials in 
the Philippines.
 In Hong Kong, gifts and hospitality are regulated 
by Chapter 201 of the “Prevention of Bribery 
Ordinance,” the “Acceptance of Advantages 
(Chief Executive’s Permission) Notice 2010,” and 
the “Civil Servants Guide to Good Practices.”72 
Hong Kong’s gift and hospitality restrictions are 
straightforward, very well-developed, and are 
printed in a user-friendly guide that is available 
online.73 Generally, government officials are 
prohibited from accepting “gifts, discounts, loans 
of money or passages” from “contacts” that have 
“official dealings” with the government official.74 
Presumably, any contractor seeking to do busi-
ness with the government of Hong Kong will have 
“official dealings” with the government official. 
Consequently, this is a general prohibition, but 
the following exceptions are also likely to apply: 
(1) Gifts available on equal terms to non-civil 
servants, 
(2) Gifts from relatives, 
(3) On occasions when gifts are tradition-
ally given, gifts not exceeding HK$3000 
(US$387) from “close personal friends” 
or gifts not exceeding HK$1500 (US$193) 
from any other person,
(4) On other occasions (presumably when 
gifts are not traditionally given), gifts not 
exceeding HK$500 (US$64) from a “close 
personal friend” or HK $250 (US$32) from 
any other person, and
(5) Loans from a “close personal friend” not 
exceeding HK$3000 (US$387) or from 
any other person not exceeding HK$1500 
(US$193), as long as it is repaid within 30 
days.75
 The laws also expressly prohibit “lavish or un-
reasonably generous or frequent entertainment 
that may lead to embarrassment in performing 
official duties or bring the public service into 
disrepute.”76 
 In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), gift and 
hospitality restrictions are found in Article 70 of 
the Federal Law Decree 11 of 2008 relating to Hu-
man Resources in the Federal Government (the 
Decree) and the Code of Ethics and Professional 
Conduct issued on June 12, 2010.77 The Decree 
prohibits the acceptance of gifts unless they 
have a symbolic, promotional, or advertisement 
purpose (they have a logo) and also comply with 
the rules of the particular Ministry.78 Article IV 
of the Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct 
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prohibits public servants and their family mem-
bers “up to the fourth degree” from accepting 
any “gifts, hospitality or services from whomso-
ever” if it will affect the official’s objectivity or 
their decisionmaking or obligate the official to 
engage in a particular undertaking as a result of 
its acceptance.79 
 In Kenya, the acceptance of gifts and hospitality 
by government officials is governed by the Public 
Officer Ethics Act, Chapter 183, Revised Edition 
2009 (2003).80 The law has numerous references 
to gifts, including the following proscriptions and 
exceptions:
(a) Public officers are prohibited from ac-
cepting gifts or favors from persons that 
have an interest that may be affected by 
the carrying out or not carrying out of the 
official’s duties, have a contractual (or 
similar) relationship with the official’s or-
ganization, or are regulated by the official’s 
organization. 81
(b) Public officials may accept gifts from rela-
tives or friends given on a “special occasion 
recognized by custom.”82
(c) A public officer may accept a gift given to 
him in his official capacity so long as it is 
nonmonetary and does not exceed 20,000 
shillings (US$231). If the gift exceeds this 
cap, it will be deemed a gift to the official’s 
organization.83
 The same law also contains specific regulations 
for the different agencies of the Kenyan govern-
ment (e.g., national security officials, military, 
ethics commission officials, judiciary, etc.).84
 Even this small sampling of foreign gift and 
hospitality restrictions demonstrates how diverse 
the ethics restrictions are across the globe. Local 
custom, the use of third parties, and interactions 
with government officials who may be unaware 
of or willing to violate the applicable legal re-
quirements further complicate the landscape. 
For contractors seeking to expand their govern-
ment business to new jurisdictions, foreign gift 
and hospitality restrictions present a compliance 
challenge that must be managed accordingly (and 
is discussed in Part III of this Briefing PaPer). 
Part II: Blowing Past The Grey Line: When 
Is A Gift Or Hospitality A Bribe? 
 While government contractors must ensure 
compliance with the myriad ethics restrictions that 
may apply to the employees of their government 
customers, they must remain even more vigilant in 
ensuring that gifts or hospitality are not offered:
(1) to influence the government official to 
perform an official act,
(2) to a government official that has solicited 
or coerced the offering of the gift, or
(3) so frequently “that a reasonable person 
would be led to believe the employee is 
using his public office for private gain.”85
 Providing a gift in violation of any of these 
provisions could potentially trigger significant 
criminal liability. Unfortunately, there is no bright 
line test for contractors seeking to comply with 
the law. Indeed, the line between gifts, bribes 
and illegal gratuities can often become blurred 
depending on the specific facts and circumstances. 
 When does a “thing of value” cross over the line 
from a “gift” to a criminal bribe or gratuity? The 
burden of distinguishing between the two falls on 
the contractor, as does the responsibility of ensur-
ing that gifts and hospitality not only comply with 
the law, but also cannot be misconstrued or even 
viewed as criminal misconduct. Should the contrac-
tor fail, the consequences can be devastating.
U.S. Domestic Public Corruption Statutes
 All 50 states and the U.S. Federal Government 
prohibit the bribery of a government official. 
While the language may differ depending on 
the jurisdiction and applicable statute, the goals 
of these statutes remain the same: ensuring that 
government officials do not accept anything of 
value in exchange for influencing the govern-
ment official’s judgment or an official act (such 
as the award of a government contract). In short, 
these laws are designed to ensure that govern-
ment officials do not use their official positions 
for private gain and to ensure that governments 
operate ethically, transparently, and without fa-
voritism toward particular individuals or entities. 
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 These goals are even more critical when 
government contracts are involved, especially 
when considerable dollar values are at stake. 
As discussed below, the consequences of giving 
and accepting bribes or illegal gratuities in the 
government procurement sphere are staggering. 
 ■ Bribery & Gratuities
 Referred to as the “centerpiece” of federal 
public corruption law, 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 prohibits 
two offenses: bribery and gratuities.86 Unlike the 
federal ethics regulations discussed in Part I of 
this Briefing PaPer, the offenses are applicable to 
both the government official and the offeror of 
the bribe or gratuity. In other words, the crimes 
are applicable to “both sides of a corrupt trans-
action: those who pay a bribe [or gratuity] are 
equally as guilty as the public official who accepts 
it.”87
 The first offense of bribery under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 201(b) “prohibits the giving or accepting of 
anything of value to or by a public official, if 
the thing is given ‘with intent to influence’ an 
official act, or if it is received by the official ‘in 
return for being influenced.’”88 To establish the 
offense of bribery, a quid pro quo is required—or 
specific intent to “receive something of value in 
exchange for an official act.”89 Under 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 201(b), bribery is punishable by, among other 
penalties, up to 15 years in prison, along with 
fines and disqualification.90 
 The recent indictment of a government contrac-
tor in Georgia demonstrates the type of scheme 
that can trigger a violation of this law. In Janu-
ary 2014, the government indicted Christopher 
Whitman, the co-owner of United Industrial of 
Georgia Inc.—a trucking company and freight 
transportation broker that contracts with the 
Federal Government—on 43 counts of money, 
property, and honest services wire fraud, five 
counts of bribery, and one count of theft of gov-
ernment property.91 Two employees of the Marine 
Corps Logistics Base in Albany, Georgia were also 
indicted.92 The indictment alleged that, among 
other things, Whitman paid nearly $1 million in 
bribes to government officials to obtain contracts 
from the government. While the alleged scheme 
also involved inflated billing rates or “unnecessary 
premium-priced requirements,” Whitman also 
purportedly corrupted public officials by “offering 
and providing things of value, including money, 
rare coins, collectible items, automobiles, fire-
arms, home improvements, housing, and meals” 
to public officials in exchange for, among other 
things, awarding freight transportation orders.93 
Moreover, two government officials were also in-
dicted and several others have pleaded guilty in 
connection with the corruption schemes outlined 
in the indictment.94
 The second offense prohibited by 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 201 is referred to as “illegal gratuities,” despite 
the fact that the term is not found in the statute. 
Specifically, 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(c) prohibits public 
officials from accepting anything of value, “for 
or because of” any official act, “and prohibits 
anyone from giving any such thing [to the public 
official] for such a reason.”95 Unlike bribery, the 
gratuities section of the statute does not require 
proof of a quid pro quo, which translates into a 
“lesser connection” between the payment and 
the official act.96 The two crimes also differ in 
the length of their sentences: a violation of 18 
U.S.C.A. § 201(c) only carries a maximum prison 
sentence of two years.97
 For example, a jury convicted Russell Hoff-
man, vice president at Surdex Corporation, of 
providing illegal gratuities to William Schwening, 
an employee of the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers.98 The Corps awarded Surdex a three-year 
contract in 1999 and Schwening was responsible 
for completing Surdex’s performance evaluation 
report pursuant to FAR 42.1502.99 Hoffman and 
Schwening had frequent “social and profes-
sional contact” throughout the performance of 
the Surdex contract.100 After the completion of 
the contract, Hoffman sent multiple emails to 
Schwening asking him to complete the perfor-
mance evaluation. Soon thereafter, Schwening 
sent an email to Hoffman which included “small 
talk” about golf clubs. The next day, Hoffman 
purchased clubs for Schwening using Surdex 
funds.101 After Schwening received the clubs, he 
sent the following email to Hoffman: “Hey buddy 
do you need ANYTHING. I hit the [clubs] last 
night straight outta the box awesome.”102 After 
a year passed and Schwening still had not com-
pleted the performance evaluation, Hoffman sent 
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another email to Schwening reminding him to 
complete the evaluation and asked: “Oh, by the 
way, how is your golf game since you got those 
new woods?”103 Schwening never completed the 
performance evaluation.104 While both Schwen-
ing and Hoffman were indicted for violating the 
gratuities statute, the jury convicted Hoffman, 
but acquitted Schwening on all counts.105 After 
Hoffman appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for Eighth Circuit, the court affirmed his con-
viction noting that the gratuities statute merely 
requires the government to establish that a gift 
was given with the intent to induce or reward 
an official action, regardless of whether that act 
occurs.106 The court also rejected Hoffman’s ar-
gument that the clubs were given as a “treat” to 
his “friend,” pointing to the fact that the clubs 
were actually purchased with Surdex funds and 
given for a business purpose—not because of a 
friendship.107 
 The distinction between a bribe and gratuity 
has been described as “vague at best”108 since dif-
ficulty can arise in distinguishing the absence or 
presence of corrupt intent. While bribery requires 
a “specific intent to give or receive something 
of value in exchange for an official act,”109 illegal 
gratuities are generally given as a “reward for a 
past official act” or in “hope of obtaining gen-
eral goodwill.”110 As the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual 
explains, “[a]n aphorism sometimes used to sum 
up the distinction between a bribe and a gratu-
ity is that a bribe says ‘please’ and a gratuity says 
‘thank you.’” It is, however, critical to remember 
that a gratuity can still “precede the official act 
that prompted it.”111 
 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 does not prohibit commercial 
bribery; it is limited to “public officials,” which 
are defined by the statute as including all offi-
cers and employees of any department, agency, 
or branch of the United States, including the 
District of Columbia, as well as private individu-
als who are acting for or on behalf of the United 
States.112 This broad definition could create 
significant liability for government contractors, 
which often act for or on behalf of the Federal 
Government. For example, in one case, the Fifth 
Circuit confirmed that the defendant’s role as 
contractor for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
qualified him as “public official” for purposes of 
the bribery statute, because contractors act “on 
behalf of the United States under the authority 
of a federal agency” that has contracted with a 
particular company.113 Similarly, in another case, 
the contractor was deemed a “public official” 
who was in a position of public trust when, as an 
employee of a defense contractor, he provided 
information that “was relied upon by officers of 
the Air Force in making decisions pertaining to 
the procurement of equipment.”114 Given that 
a contractor’s role and authority may qualify 
an individual as a “public official,” contractor 
employees must be careful when accepting gifts 
and hospitality or any other item of value that 
could be perceived as an improper influence. 
 While the bribery and illegal gratuities schemes 
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.A. § 201 are often egre-
gious (i.e., involving large sums of money and/or 
extravagant gifts), contractors must keep in mind 
that bribery and illegal gratuities schemes do not 
always involve secretive wire transfers to offshore 
bank accounts or briefcases stuffed with cash. To 
the contrary, many of the cases involve gifts and 
hospitality that could be viewed as a perfectly 
acceptable business courtesy in the private sec-
tor. The term “thing of value” “has been broadly 
construed to focus on the worth attached to the 
bribe by [the government official] rather than its 
commercial value.”115 Thus, anything viewed as 
valuable by the public official, whether tangible 
or intangible, could potentially trigger liability 
if viewed as an attempt to improperly influence 
a government official to obtain a contract or 
favorable treatment.
 ■ Other Domestic “Public Corruption” Statutes
 In addition to the bribery and illegal gratuities 
statute located at 18 U.S.C.A. § 201, the Federal 
Government has many other statutes that it can 
use to prosecute public corruption. Indeed, the 
Federal Government has an enormous statutory 
toolbox at its disposal, in addition to the panoply of 
state criminal statutes that similarly aim to punish 
and deter the corruption of government officials. 
Contractors doing business in numerous differ-
ent jurisdictions must be aware of and remain in 
compliance with the full arsenal of anti-corruption 
laws that are available for prosecuting the improper 
influence of government officials. 
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 The first commonly used tool is honest ser-
vices fraud. Indeed, many “bribery” cases will 
also include this charge, located at 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1346.116 The statute is designed to protect 
the “intangible right to honest services” in the 
government.117 It does this by allowing for the 
prosecution of actions that defraud citizens of 
their right to the honest and faithful services of 
a public official118 and criminalizes “schemes to 
defraud” that involve bribery or kickbacks.119 
 Government contractors that have sought to 
improperly influence government officials to 
obtain contracts have been charged and con-
victed of honest services fraud. For example, 
in 2007, a jury found Brent Wilkes guilty on 
thirteen counts: one count of conspiracy, ten 
counts of honest services wire fraud, one count 
of bribery of a public official, and one count 
of money laundering.120 For years, Wilkes plied 
then-Congressman Randy “Duke” Cunningham 
with, “expensive meals, lavish trips, a houseboat 
in Washington, D.C., and mortgage payments for 
[Cunningham’s] multi-million dollar home in San 
Diego County” in exchange for lucrative defense 
contracts (obtained through Cunningham’s in-
fluence and assistance).121 For nearly a decade, 
Wilkes provided gifts and payments totaling over 
$700,000 in exchange for more than $80 million 
in defense contracts directed by Cunningham.122 A 
judge sentenced Wilkes to 12 years in prison and 
ordered him to pay a $636,116 criminal forfeiture 
or a $500,000 fine.123 On appeal, the 9th Circuit 
affirmed Wilkes’s honest services fraud convic-
tions, noting that the “government presented 
substantial evidence that Wilkes engaged ‘in a 
course of conduct of favors and gifts’ in exchange 
for benefits and support from Cunningham.”124 
The case not only demonstrates the substantial 
risks that may stem from a contractor offering 
gifts or hospitality to a government official who 
can influence contract awards, but also the vast 
number and variety of charges that the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) will often include when 
prosecuting public corruption. 
 Another tool used for battling federal public 
corruption is 18 U.S.C.A. § 666, a statute designed 
to “extend federal bribery prohibitions to bribes 
offered to state and local officials employed by 
agencies receiving federal funds.”125 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 666 criminalizes the solicitation or demand for 
anything of value from anyone “intending to be 
influenced or rewarded in connection with any” 
business or transaction, or anyone who offers or 
agrees to give “anything of value to any person, 
with intent to influence or reward an agent of an 
organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal 
government, or any agency thereof, in connec-
tion with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions of such organization, government, 
or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 
or more.”126 The $5000 statutory minimum is 
triggered by a single transaction of $5000 or 
multiple transactions of lesser amounts (total-
ing at least $5000) as long as they are part of a 
single plan or scheme.127 The statute is applicable 
to any state, local or Indian tribal governments 
(or any of their agencies) that receive in any 
one year period, “benefits” exceeding $10,000 
“under a Federal program involving a grant, 
contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or 
other form of Federal assistance.”128 For example, 
a jury convicted Larry Jennings, Sr., a housing 
repair contractor, of three counts of violating 18 
U.S.C.A. § 666, for giving cash payments, totaling 
more than $5000, to Charles Morris, the admin-
istrator of the Housing Authority of Baltimore 
City contracting program.129 In return, Morris 
placed Jennings on a list of contractors eligible 
for “no-bid” contracts and awarded contracts to 
Jenning’s company.130 The Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the conviction stating that “a reasonable juror 
could have found that Jennings’s payments to 
Morris were bribes, that is, gifts made with the 
corrupt intent to induce Morris to engage in, or 
to reward him for engaging in, official actions 
on behalf of Jennings’s companies.”131
 Although the Federal Government has ad-
ditional substantive statutes132 that it may use to 
prosecute public corruption, contractors should 
also be aware of two additional statutes that are 
frequently employed in these prosecutions. The 
most commonly alleged crime in a public cor-
ruption case is conspiracy.133 In short, conspiracy 
may be charged where two or more persons agree 
to conspire to commit an offense against the 
United States or to defraud the United States with 
knowledge and intent to commit an overt act. In a 
bribery prosecution, as applicable to the offeror, 
conspiracy may be charged where two or more 
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persons offer a bribe, rendering the conspiracy 
a distinct offense from the substantive charge of 
bribery.134 For example, in 2013, a jury convicted 
Robert Ehnow, the owner and resident of defense 
contractor L&N Industrial Tool & Supply Inc., 
Centerline Industrial Inc. (a defense contractor), 
and Joanne Loehr, the owner and operator of 
Centerline, with “conspiracy and bribery in con-
nection with a fraud and corruption scheme at 
Naval Air Station (NAS) North Island, in Coro-
nado, California.”135 The government charged 
the defendants with one count of engaging in 
a conspiracy to commit wire fraud, bribery, and 
money laundering and with additional counts 
of bribery.136 At trial, the government presented 
evidence showing that as “part of the conspiracy, 
defense contractors provided U.S. Navy officials 
with a wide range of personal benefits, including 
cash, checks, retail gift cards, flat screen televi-
sion sets, luxury massage chairs, bicycles costing 
thousands of dollars, model airplanes, and other 
items. In return, the [N]avy officials placed millions 
of dollars in government orders with the defense 
contractors.”137 To cover the cost of the bribes, the 
defendants submitted fraudulent invoices to the 
Department of Defense that included the cost of 
bribes provided to the government officials. In 
addition, the defendants also routinely charged 
a markup on the fraudulent invoices.138
 Many public corruption cases also contain a 
charge of “aiding and abetting,”139 which, unlike 
conspiracy, is not alleged as separate offense 
from the substantive bribery charge.140 Under the 
statute, “the acts of the perpetrator become the 
acts of the aider and abettor and the latter can 
be charged with having done the acts himself” 
even if she or she was not present at the time 
the bribe was given.141 Thus, an individual or 
company convicted of aiding or abetting a crime 
is “as guilty as if they had directly committed the 
offense themselves.”142 Because aiding and abet-
ting is not an independent crime, the government 
must prove that the defendant committed the 
underlying bribery offense.143
 In addition to federal public corruption statutes, 
contractors that operate at the state and local level 
must also be aware of the myriad state and local 
laws that prohibit the bribery or improper influence 
of government officials. While statutes such as 18 
U.S.C.A.§ 666 allow the Federal Government to 
prosecute corruption at the state and local level, 
contractors should not forget that every state has 
its own laws prohibiting the bribery of govern-
ment officials. Although the specific prohibitions 
and consequences vary from state to state, most 
share similar characteristics, including (1) broad 
applicability to government officials, employees, 
and other individuals acting in a governmental 
capacity; (2) broadly defining what constitutes 
a “thing of value” or “benefit” under the statute; 
(3) a requirement that the bribe be offered to the 
government official with the intent to influence 
a decision, judgment, or action, and (4) liability 
for both the bribe-giver and bribe recipient. Con-
tractors should be aware of the public corruption 
laws in every state in which they do business with 
government entities or have contact with govern-
ment officials. While each state code should be 
consulted, the NCSL has crafted a helpful chart 
that outlines the “Penalties for Violations of State 
Ethics and Public Corruption Laws” for all 50 
states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto 
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.144 This is a useful 
launching point for anyone researching these laws, 
although as the organization cautions, the chart 
“is intended to provide general information and 
does not necessarily address all aspects of [the] 
topic. Because the facts of each situation may vary, 
[the] information [in the chart] may need to be 
supplemented by consulting legal advisors.”145
 ■ Additional Consequences For Government  
 Contractors
 Contractors that violate criminal statutes relat-
ing to bribery or illegal gratuities have additional 
requirements and potentially face additional 
penalties if the misconduct involves a federal 
contract. For example, FAR 52.203-3 grants the 
Federal Government the authority to terminate 
the contract if it is determined (after notice 
and hearing) that the contractor or its agent/
representative “(1) [o]ffered or gave a gratuity 
(e.g., an entertainment or a gift) to an officer, 
official, or employee of the Government; and 
(2) [i]ntended, by the gratuity, to obtain a con-
tract or favorable treatment under a contract.”146 
Violation of this clause may result in additional 
consequences beyond termination, including 
debarment, suspension, or exemplary damages.147
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 Even if the misconduct does not involve a 
federally funded contract, a government con-
tractor’s business with the Federal Government 
may be negatively affected. For example, when 
Science Applications International Corporation 
(SAIC) entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement to resolve allegations of fraud and 
kickbacks relating to its CityTime contract with 
New York City, it faced potential suspension and 
debarment by the Federal Government.148 While 
SAIC was not ultimately excluded from future 
federal contracting opportunities, it did enter 
into a five-year administrative agreement with the 
U.S. Army where it was required, among other 
things, to maintain a contractor responsibility 
program, retain an independent monitor, and 
submit reports to the Army.149 
 Moreover, the FAR places additional reporting 
requirements on certain government contractors 
to ensure that potential violations of these laws are 
timely reported to the government. Specifically, 
FAR 52.203-13 requires a contractor to, among 
other things, “timely disclose, in writing, to the 
agency Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 
with a copy to the Contracting Officer, whenever, 
in connection with the award, performance, or 
closeout of [the] contract or any subcontract 
thereunder, the Contractor has credible evidence 
that a principal, employee, agent, or subcontractor 
of the Contractor has committed…[a]violation 
of Federal criminal law involving fraud, conflict 
of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations found in 
Title 18 of the United States Code.”150 Under 
this “Mandatory Disclosure Rule,” the knowing 
failure to timely disclose credible evidence of any 
of these violations creates an independent basis 
for suspension or debarment under FAR 9.4.151 
Foreign Public Corruption Statutes
 Contractors that do business with government 
entities outside the United States face a multi-
tude of challenges in addition to those they must 
grapple with domestically. For the past decade, 
increasing U.S. enforcement of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practice Act (FCPA)152 has made clear to 
companies operating in foreign countries that 
prior questionable business practices abroad will 
be prosecuted, and arguments about a foreign 
country’s culture or customary business practices 
will not serve as a valid defense. Moreover, as 
the United States has placed pressure on other 
countries to enforce their foreign bribery statutes, 
contractors must not only worry about compliance 
with the FCPA, but also be cognizant of the con-
tours of other countries’ anti-corruption statutes. 
Finally, contractors must continue to be aware of 
domestic anti-corruption laws in other countries 
that prohibit the bribery of their government of-
ficials. Although other countries may not enforce 
their domestic anti-corruption statutes as actively 
as the United States, increasing pressure from 
other countries (as well as international treaty 
obligations) has influenced many countries to 
begin ramping up their enforcement efforts. 
 ■ U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
 Generally, the FCPA prohibits the bribery of 
foreign government officials and requires covered 
persons and entities to maintain accurate books 
and records and an adequate system of internal 
accounting controls.153 The two components of 
the FCPA, often referred to as the “anti-bribery 
prohibitions” and the “books and records provi-
sions” were designed to work in tandem to pre-
vent companies from hiding bribes and other 
improper transactions in off-book accounts and 
slush funds to conceal their misconduct.154 There 
is, however, no requirement that the accounting 
provisions be linked to the bribery of a foreign 
official. Consequently, the Government may 
prosecute a company for violating the account-
ing provisions, even in the absence of a separate 
violation of the anti-bribery prohibitions.155
 The FCPA is famous for its incredibly broad 
jurisdiction, much to the dismay (and often, 
surprise) of non-U.S. companies that have found 
themselves ensnared by the statute’s expansive 
jurisdictional provisions.156 The FCPA applies to 
companies and persons based on either (a) the 
country in which the improper activity occurred 
(territorial-based jurisdiction) or (b) the origin 
of the party committing the act (nationality-based 
jurisdiction). Territorial jurisdiction covers per-
sons or companies that commit an act within the 
territory of the United States “in furtherance of” 
a corrupt payment or offer of payment, using the 
U.S. mails or other means or instrumentalities 
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of interstate commerce. In addition, since 1998, 
the “in furtherance of” requirement has been 
expanded as applied to foreign companies and 
persons, covering any act taken within the United 
States that furthers the improper payment.157 
Under this standard, liability is triggered merely 
by conduct that facilitates or carries forward the 
prohibited activity. Territorial jurisdiction applies 
to “issuers,”158 “domestic concerns,” 159 and for-
eign companies and persons.160 Nationality-based 
jurisdiction, applicable to domestic concerns 
and U.S. issuers, may be triggered by an act that 
takes place entirely outside the United States, as 
long as the act is in furtherance of the improper 
payment or offer, regardless of whether the U.S. 
mails or other means or instrumentalities of in-
terstate commerce are used.161
 The anti-bribery prohibitions of the FCPA 
prohibit the “offering to pay, paying, promising 
to pay, or authorizing the payment of money or 
anything of value to a foreign official in order 
to influence any act or decision of the foreign 
official in his or her official capacity or to secure 
any other improper advantage in order to obtain 
or retain business.”162 Similar to the U.S. domestic 
bribery statute, the term “anything of value” is 
construed very broadly, depends on the subjective 
value attached by the foreign official-recipient 
and does not impose a minimum dollar thresh-
old on the improper gift or payment.163 Equally 
important is the requirement that the thing of 
value be provided with “corrupt intent”—requir-
ing the improper gift or payment to be made with 
the intent to secure an improper advantage or 
to improperly influence a government official. 
Moreover, there must be a “business purpose” to 
the payment; it must have been given to obtain 
or retain a business advantage.164 While bribing a 
foreign government official to obtain a contract 
will undoubtedly satisfy this standard, the busi-
ness purpose test is far broader, encompassing 
bribery payments provided to avoid things like 
customs duties, licensing, zoning approvals, 
avoiding inspections, or reducing tax liabilities.
 The statute’s knowledge standard is incredibly 
broad and is designed to ensure that companies 
do not hide behind their agents or other third 
parties to avoid liability for the bribery of foreign 
government officials. Specifically, the statute 
“covers payments made to ‘any person, while 
knowing that all or a portion of such money or 
thing of value will be offered, given, or promised, 
directly or indirectly’ to a foreign official.”165 
Given the significant liability that may result from 
the activities of third parties, companies must be 
extremely careful in their selection and oversight 
of agents or intermediaries hired to assist them 
in foreign countries. Indeed, the vast majority of 
FCPA cases have been the direct result of third 
parties bribing government officials on behalf of 
a particular company.166 As the government has 
made clear, liability may be imposed “not only 
on those with actual knowledge of wrongdoing, 
but also on those who purposefully avoid actual 
knowledge.”167 To reduce the risk of liability that 
may result from the actions of an agent or other 
intermediary, companies must implement an 
effective compliance program, including robust 
due diligence and oversight procedures for the 
selection and monitoring of third party activities. 
Companies that ignore bribery “red flags” in the 
vetting or monitoring of third parties proceed at 
their own peril.168 
 The FCPA provides one limited exception 
to the anti-bribery prohibitions as well as two 
affirmative defenses. The facilitating payment 
exception states that the anti-bribery prohibi-
tions do not apply “to any facilitating payment or 
expediting payment to a foreign official, politi-
cal party, or party official the purpose of which 
is to expedite or to secure the performance of 
a routine governmental action.”169 This extremely 
limited exception is designed to permit payments 
used to expedite “non-discretionary, ministerial 
activities performed by mid- or low-level foreign 
functionaries.”170 The exception is so limited and 
rarely invoked properly that it is often called “il-
lusory.”171 
 Indeed, the landscape surrounding facilitat-
ing payments has become so murky that many 
companies no longer include the facilitating pay-
ment exception in their anti-corruption policies. 
One reason for this is the dwindling number of 
countries that make an exception for facilitating 
payments in their foreign anti-bribery statutes. 
Indeed, most countries, including the United 
Kingdom, prohibit them. Another reason is that 
even if the payment technically qualifies under 
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the exception, it could create liability in other 
areas. For example, while the payment may be 
excluded from the anti-bribery prohibitions, a 
company must still ensure that it records the pay-
ment properly in its books and records. There 
are countless examples of companies that have 
run afoul of the books and records prohibitions 
by failing to properly record a facilitating pay-
ment.172 In addition, even if the payment meets 
the definition of “facilitating payment” and is 
properly recorded, it is still likely to be illegal in 
the country in which has been paid. By attempting 
to comply with the books and records provisions 
of the FCPA, a company may effectively create 
a record of its violation of the local anti-bribery 
law. 
 Of the two FCPA affirmative defenses, one is 
useful to companies while the other is obsolete. 
The latter provides a defense to liability under 
the anti-bribery prohibitions for payments or 
gifts to foreign officials if they are lawful under 
the written laws and regulations of the foreign 
official’s country.173 Given the unlikelihood that 
a country’s laws permit the bribery of its govern-
ment officials, it is hard to imagine a situation in 
which this affirmative defense could be success-
fully invoked. 
 The second affirmative defense is tremen-
dously important to companies and government 
contractors, as it permits companies to pay a 
foreign official’s “reasonable and bona fide” 
expenses as long as they are directly related to 
the promotion or demonstration of a product or 
to the performance of a government contract.174 
This affirmative defense is critical to government 
contractors due to a genuine need to cover a for-
eign official’s travel and hospitality expenses for 
a variety of legitimate business reasons, including 
the performance of a contract. To qualify for 
the affirmative defense, expenditures must be 
modest, reasonable, and closely related to the 
contours of the defense.175 In addition, under 
the books and records provisions of the FCPA, 
all gifts must be properly accounted for and ac-
curately recorded.176
 Over the years, the U.S. Government has pro-
vided the public with detailed guidance regard-
ing its expectations relating to hospitality and 
promotional expenditures under this defense. 
Through its enforcement actions, Opinion Pro-
cedure Releases, and comprehensive publication, 
“A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act,”177 issued jointly by the DOJ and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the 
government is not hiding the ball with regards to 
its expectations for company gift and hospitality 
policies. While detailed gift and hospitality com-
pliance guidance will be provided in Section III 
of this Briefing PaPer, some important lessons 
may be drawn from these resources. 
 First, companies should not sweat the small 
stuff. The DOJ has made clear that modest meals 
and hospitality, reasonable cab fare, and even 
company promotional items (usually with logos) 
“are unlikely to improperly influence an official, 
and, as a result, are not, without more, items that 
have resulted in enforcement action by DOJ or 
SEC.”178 The government has, however, noted 
that the more extravagant the gift or hospitality, 
the more likely it will trigger liability. Specifically, 
the government explained that enforcement 
actions have resulted from “single instances of 
large, extravagant gift-giving (such as sports 
cars, fur coats, and other luxury items) as well 
as widespread gifts of smaller items as part of a 
pattern of bribes.”179 
 For example, UTStarcom Inc.’s (UTSI) 2009 
FCPA enforcement action illustrates what not to 
do with respect to gifts and hospitality under 
the FCPA. In an attempt to obtain and retain 
telecommunications contracts from state-owned 
telecommunications firms in China, the com-
pany arranged and paid for employees of the 
state-owned firms to travel to “popular tourist 
destinations in the United States, including 
Hawaii, Las Vegas and New York City.”180 While 
the company disguised the trips as training in its 
facilities (falsely recording the trips as “training” 
expenses in its books and records), the company 
had no facilities in those locations and conducted 
no training.181 In addition, while UTSI’s bid for a 
contract with a government-controlled telecom-
munications entity in Thailand was under con-
sideration, “UTSI’s general manager in Thailand 
spent nearly $10,000 on French wine as a gift to 
agents of the government customer, including 
rare bottles that cost more than $600 each. The 
manager also spent $13,000 for entertainment 
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expenses for the same customer in an attempt 
to secure the contract.”182 UTSI paid $3 million 
to settle its FCPA enforcement action with the 
DOJ and SEC.183
 The consequences of violating the FCPA can 
be staggering, sometimes resulting in hundreds 
of millions of dollars in fines and penalties.184 
In addition to these costs, many companies 
find themselves spending millions on internal 
investigations once alleged FCPA violations are 
brought to light. As of February 2014, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. has spent over $300 million on its 
investigation into bribery allegations in Mexico, 
India, and China, and estimates that it will spend 
another $200 to $240 million on FCPA-related 
matters and compliance expenditures in fiscal 
year 2015.185 The government has also continued 
the trend of prosecuting responsible individuals 
and seeking lengthy prison sentences as a means 
of deterring and punishing offenders. As Mark 
Mendelsohn, the former Deputy Chief of the DOJ’s 
FCPA Division, once explained: “The number 
of individual prosecutions has risen—and that’s 
not an accident….That is quite intentional on 
the part of the Department. It is our view that to 
have a credible deterrent effect, people have to 
go to jail. People have to be prosecuted where 
appropriate. This is a federal crime. This is not 
fun and games.”186
 In addition to the consequences faced by most 
companies subject to the FCPA’s jurisdiction, 
government contractors must also be aware of 
additional consequences that may stem from 
violations of the FCPA, including but not limited 
to, suspension or debarment (in the United States 
or other countries), loss of licenses or clearances, 
inability to receive loans, loss of commercial busi-
ness, and severe reputational damage.187 
 ■ Other Foreign Anti-Bribery Laws
 Due, in part, to the decades-long effort by 
the United States to convince other countries to 
enact foreign anti-bribery prohibitions similar 
to the FCPA, contractors that conduct business 
outside the United States may find themselves 
within the jurisdictional reach of the criminal 
anti-bribery laws of other countries. Multilateral 
commitments, such as the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) have 
spawned implementing legislation across the 
globe designed to, among other things, combat 
bribery in international business.188 
 The most famous and feared example is the 
UK Bribery Act, often referred to as the “FCPA 
on steroids.” Jurisdiction is triggered by any act 
or omission that forms part of the offense that 
takes place in the UK or an act committed outside 
the UK by a party that has a “close connection” 
with the UK.189 Individuals or entities deemed to 
have a close connection” with the UK include, 
but are not limited to, British citizens, British 
overseas territories citizens, British Nationals 
(Overseas), individuals “ordinarily resident” in 
the UK, and bodies “incorporated under the law 
of any part of the United Kingdom.” 190 Similar 
to the FCPA, the UK Bribery Act prohibits the 
bribery of foreign officials, but it also prohibits 
commercial bribery and the acceptance of bribes 
(often referred to as “passive” or “demand side” 
bribery).191 The Bribery Act also creates a strict 
liability offense for the failure of a commercial 
organization to prevent bribery.192 To avoid liability 
under this section, a company must be able to 
demonstrate that it has “adequate procedures” 
in place to prevent bribery.193 
 In addition, further distinguishing itself from 
the FCPA, the Bribery Act does not provide an 
exception for facilitating payments or an affirma-
tive defense for hospitality payments. The Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO), a UK government department 
tasked with prosecuting and investigating fraud 
and corruption, has clarified that the prosecution 
of matters involving facilitating payments and/or 
hospitality expenditures depends on a variety of 
factors, including the sufficiency of the evidence 
and whether a prosecution is in the public inter-
est.194 
 While the lack of an affirmative defense for 
hospitality expenditures may be discomforting to 
companies, the UK Ministry of Justice has been 
clear that the Bribery Act does not “prohibit reason-
able and proportionate hospitality and promotional 
or other similar business expenditure intended 
for these purposes.”195 The Ministry of Justice’s 
guidance on the Bribery Act explains, however, 
that there are instances in which “hospitality and 
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promotional or other similar business expenditure 
can be employed as bribes,” in violation of the 
Act. Whether a violation has occurred turns on 
the “connection between the advantage and the 
intention to influence and secure business or a 
business advantage.”196 Factors that the SFO will 
consider in making this analysis include (1) the 
type and level of hospitality or “advantage” offered 
(the more lavish or expensive, the more suspect), 
(2) the manner and form in which it is provided, 
and (3) the level of influence the particular for-
eign public official has over awarding the busi-
ness.197 Still, companies must keep in mind that 
the SFO will not consider these expenditures in 
a vacuum and prosecutions will be constrained 
by resources. As the SFO has declared, it is not 
the “serious champagne office.”198
 Canada’s legislation, the Corruption of Foreign 
Public Officials Act (CFPOA), came into force in 
1999.199 This was quite a development consider-
ing that bribes were tax deductible in Canada 
until the 1990s.200 The CFPOA is far more simi-
lar to the FCPA than the UK Bribery Act, as the 
anti-bribery prohibitions are limited to foreign 
government officials and do not cover commer-
cial or passive bribery. It also shares the FCPA’s 
affirmative defenses regarding local laws and 
reasonable expenses relating to the promotion of 
a company’s products or services or performance 
of the contract.201 While facilitating payments are 
currently excluded under the CFPOA, legislators 
have indicated that this is likely to change so 
that Canada joins the majority of countries that 
prohibit facilitating payments.202 Jurisdiction is 
generally triggered by a “real and substantial” 
link between the alleged offence and Canada or 
the alleged offence is committed by a Canadian 
citizen, permanent resident, or organization 
incorporated, formed, or otherwise organized 
under the laws of Canada or a province.203 
 Criticized by the OECD as recently as 2011 
for its lagging enforcement,204 Canada has since 
ramped up its enforcement efforts and amended 
the CFPOA to, among other things, expand its 
jurisdiction, strengthen penalties, and broaden 
the range of conduct prohibited by the legisla-
tion.205 It has also successfully prosecuted several 
high profile cases, including Niko Resources Ltd., 
a publicly traded oil and gas company based in 
Calgary. The corporation pleaded guilty to brib-
ing a Bangladeshi minister with, among other 
things, a luxury SUV (Toyota Land Cruiser), and 
a trip to New York and Calgary.206 The company 
paid a fine of C$9.5 million (US$9.7 million) and 
agreed to three years of probation.207 Niko also 
spent over $900,000 investigating the allegations 
internally.208
 There are many other examples of similar legisla-
tion in other countries, creating a growing web of 
potential liability for companies that do business 
abroad.209 While enforcement varies dramatically 
by country (the United States is still the enforce-
ment leader, pursuing “approximately two formal 
foreign bribery actions for every formal foreign 
bribery action pursued by all other countries in the 
world combined since 2002210), many countries are 
increasingly pursuing foreign bribery enforcement 
actions. The latest Global Enforcement Report 
released by TRACE International indicates that 
the number of formal foreign bribery actions by 
countries other than the United States increased 
by 71% between 2012 and 2013.211 
 There has also been a dramatic increase in 
domestic bribery prosecutions in other countries, 
as many of them have been ramping up efforts 
to prosecute cases involving the corruption of 
their own public officials. Similar to the United 
States, the domestic public corruption laws are 
designed to ensure that government officials 
do not exploit their government positions for 
private gain. While enforcement of these do-
mestic statutes has lagged in many countries for 
decades, there has been an uptick in prosecutions 
in certain countries—fueled by embarrassing 
global media coverage, changes in leadership 
and obligations under international treaties. 
For example, China recently announced one 
of the broadest Chinese anti-corruption cam-
paigns in history.212 While this crackdown has 
targeted dozens of Chinese businesspersons 
and government officials, it has also ensnared 
foreign companies and individuals (including 
local employees and subsidiaries of foreign 
companies) that have bribed Chinese officials. 
According to TRACE International, the latter 
has positioned China as a leader (excluding 
the United States) of countries prosecuting the 
bribery of their own government officials.213 
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 Government contractors doing business in 
countries with robust or increasingly robust 
enforcement of domestic bribery statutes must 
be conscious of the multitude of anti-corruption 
laws applicable to their activities abroad. Indeed, 
a bribe paid to a Chinese government official by 
a company incorporated in the United Kingdom, 
with securities listed on a U.S. exchange, could 
result in liability in China, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. Furthermore, if the corrupt 
activity also takes place in other countries, it could 
trigger prosecutions by additional jurisdictions. 
 These scenarios are neither academic nor 
speculative. The rise in both domestic and for-
eign anti-bribery enforcement actions has led 
to a confluence of multi-jurisdictional prosecu-
tions for the same or related conduct. Alstom, 
a French multinational energy and transporta-
tion company, is a prime example of this trend. 
Authorities in numerous countries have been 
investigating allegations that Alstom (and certain 
Alstom employees and subsidiaries) have, among 
other things, engaged in money laundering and 
the bribery of government officials in Singapore, 
Indonesia, Venezuela, Brazil, Italy, Zambia, Po-
land, Mexico, Latvia, Tunisia, and Malaysia.214 
As a result, enforcement agencies in the United 
States, Switzerland, Italy, France, Brazil, Mexico, 
and Slovenia have launched formal proceedings 
or are (as of April 2014) still investigating the 
allegations of corruption. In addition, among 
other related consequences, the company and 
several of its subsidiaries were debarred from 
contracting with the World Bank and the Mexican 
Government.215 
 Countries are also increasingly cooperating 
with each other pursuant to international treaty 
obligations, including the sharing of information 
relating to international bribery investigations.216 
Companies can no longer assume that what hap-
pens in one country stays in that country. More-
over, companies often find that their improper 
activity is rarely limited to one country. When a 
company’s commitment to ethics and compliance 
is viewed by its officers and employees as less im-
portant than profit, the “profit driven” culture 
permeates all aspects of the company, driving 
corrupt activities across numerous borders. This 
is why many FCPA enforcement actions involve 
corruption in multiple jurisdictions, such as the 
Alstom case discussed above. After a company 
completes a thorough internal investigation 
and the dust finally settles, it often finds that 
employees across the globe have been obtaining 
and retaining business through illicit means. 
Part III: Gift & Hospitality Compliance  
Policies
 As the previous sections of this Briefing PaPer 
demonstrate, ethics and anti-corruption laws 
can be complicated, difficult to find, and even 
challenging to interpret. These problems are 
exacerbated for government contractors that 
do business in numerous different jurisdictions. 
While finding the applicable gift and hospitality 
laws in a particular jurisdiction can be incredibly 
challenging, implementing policies to ensure that 
contractor-employees do not run afoul of the 
restrictions demands significant resources and 
attention. How does a government contractor 
ensure compliance with the law when the same 
activity—the giving of gifts and hospitality—is 
subject to dozens (or even hundreds) of differ-
ent laws and standards? While no company is 
immune from employee misconduct, contractors 
should take steps to mitigate the risk of violating 
applicable laws through the implementation of 
a robust, effective, and risk-based compliance 
program. 
 Compliance policies and procedures have 
always been critical for U.S. government con-
tractors given the innumerable laws applicable 
to their government procurement activities. In 
the past decade, however, the robust compliance 
landscape has expanded to the private sector, as 
governmental authorities in the United States and 
other countries have made clear that an effec-
tive compliance program and stringent internal 
controls are the linchpin of corporate ethics and 
compliance.
 As government regulators and enforcement 
agencies increasingly expect companies to develop 
and implement effective ethics and compliance 
programs, they have issued guidance about their 
baseline expectations for compliance policies 
and procedures. For example, the DOJ and SEC’s 
“A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt 
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Practices Act” outlines the “Hallmarks of an Ef-
fective Compliance Program” in Chapter 5.217 
Similarly, the UK Ministry of Justice has published 
guidance regarding the six principles that should 
inform companies’ anti-bribery procedures.218 
Additionally, international organizations, such 
as the OECD, United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), and the World Bank have 
also released similar guidance regarding integrity 
and compliance best practices.219 
 While these resources may provide companies 
with “guidance” and “suggested best practices,” 
for government contractors that do business with 
the Federal Government, an effective ethics and 
compliance program is not optional: it is a legal 
requirement. Indeed, FAR 52.203-13 requires 
contractors to implement a “Contractor Code 
of Business Ethics and Conduct.”220 The clause 
is designed to ensure that contractors “conduct 
themselves with the highest degree of integrity 
and honesty” and maintain a written code of 
business ethics and conduct.221 The FAR clause 
also outlines the types of policies, procedures, 
and internal controls that Federal Government 
contractors are expected to implement.222 
 In light of the resources now available to 
companies regarding compliance best practices, 
government regulators and enforcement agencies 
have little sympathy for companies that claim 
ignorance about the necessity of an effective 
compliance program. They are equally harsh with 
companies that do compliance “on the cheap,” 
such as downloading and adopting the policies 
and codes of conduct found on the internet, 
dedicating little to no resources to compliance 
activities, failing to provide ethics and compliance 
training to employees, or ignoring red flags of 
corruption or unethical behavior. A contractor 
that maintains a “paper” compliance program 
will eventually run afoul of a law—resulting in 
huge fines, penalties, investigative costs, reputa-
tional damage, and other related consequences. 
As former U.S. Deputy Attorney General Paul 
McNulty once said: “If you think compliance is 
expensive, try non-compliance.”223
 ■ Gift & Hospitality Policies & Procedures
 One of the most critical aspects of an effective 
compliance program is robust gift and hospital-
ity policies and procedures. Developing effective 
policies and procedures is often difficult for 
companies, especially for those that operate in 
numerous jurisdictions. Crafting a one-size-fits-all 
policy is often impossible given the variety of laws 
that regulate this activity. Instead, policies and 
procedures must be narrowly tailored to address 
the variations found in the applicable laws. They 
must also be customized to address a company’s 
business practices, areas of risk, and designated 
compliance resources. 
 In general, gifts and hospitality policies and 
procedures must be clear, in writing, and made 
available to everyone covered by the policy. They 
should also be translated into various languages 
for overseas employees and, when necessary, third 
parties. The policies and procedures should also, 
at a minimum, address the following issues: 
(1) Who is offering the gift or hospitality? 
(2) What is the nature and monetary value of 
the gift or hospitality?
(3) Who is the recipient? 
(4) What is the recipient’s title and what are 
the recipient’s duties?
(5) Is there a business purpose associated with 
the gift or hospitality? 
(6) Does the recipient have the ability to make 
decisions that could help or hinder the 
company’s business? 
(7) Does the recipient have a relationship 
with someone that has decisionmaking 
authority that could affect the company’s 
business?
(8) Does the company have any current or 
anticipated business with, or decisions 
coming before, the recipient’s organiza-
tion or agency?
(9) Is the gift or hospitality consistent with 
applicable laws, the company gift and hos-
pitality policies, and the recipient’s ethics 
code and compliance policies? 
(10) Who approves requests to provide gifts and 
hospitality? 
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(11) Is there a monetary threshold that triggers 
an approval process? 
(12) Is this the first time the recipient has re-
ceived a gift or hospitality from the com-
pany? If not, what is the frequency and 
timing of the gifts and hospitality? 
 ■ Common Gift & Hospitality Policies &  
 Procedures
 (a) Defining the Purpose, Scope and Relevant Ter-
minology—The introductory statements found 
in most gifts and hospitality policies inform 
covered individuals of the reason for the poli-
cies and procedures, describe which individuals 
are covered by the policy, and define key terms. 
The introduction may also clarify that any gift 
or hospitality must comply with all relevant, 
applicable laws and the contractor’s policies 
and procedures. In addition, it should remind 
covered individuals that the policies trump any 
“customary” practices that may be encountered 
in certain jurisdictions—particularly those that 
are less rigorous.
 An effective policy will describe who is covered 
by the policy, such as employees, directors, ex-
ecutives and, where appropriate, third parties. 
Moreover, the introduction should indicate 
whether it is limited to interactions with govern-
ment officials or also covers gift-giving between 
private parties. It should also define key terms 
so that all covered individuals understand the 
conduct, activities, and individuals covered by 
the policy. Critical terms that must be defined 
include “third parties” (or “intermediaries”), 
“gift,” “hospitality,” and “government official.” 
The terms should be defined broadly, though 
make clear that they are not exhaustive. The policy 
should also point individuals in the direction of 
resources that are available to address issues that 
may not be covered by the policy.
 (b) General Policies and Prohibitions—The poli-
cies should provide, at a minimum, a brief state-
ment that makes clear to covered individuals 
that the company competes solely on the merits 
of its products and services and that it does not 
offer gifts or hospitality in an attempt to obtain 
or retain an improper business advantage from 
government officials or other individuals that 
have the authority to help or hinder the business. 
The policies should also remind individuals that 
gifts and hospitality must be provided openly and 
transparently.
 (c) Prohibited Gifts and Hospitality—An effective 
policy will provide guidance regarding the cat-
egories of gifts and hospitality that will never be 
approved under any circumstance. This generally 
covers items such as cash or cash equivalents (i.e., 
travelers’ checks or gift cards), per diem payments, 
loans, or other similar things of value that are 
unlikely to have a justifiable business purpose 
and look like bribes. Other items that are often 
strictly prohibited by contractors include gifts or 
hospitality that violate applicable laws and policies 
and those that have the appearance of illegality. 
To ensure that gifts comply with local laws, many 
companies consult with local counsel about the 
relevant gift or hospitality restrictions. It is also 
prudent to obtain written verification that the 
potential gifts or hospitality are consistent with 
local laws and policies. 
 In addition to the list of “strictly prohibited” 
items, policies should warn covered individuals 
that certain gifts, while not illegal, may raise the 
appearance of impropriety, which may cause 
significant damage to the company’s reputation 
(such as gifts or hospitality given so frequently 
that they could be perceived as an attempt to 
influence the recipient). Similarly, it is a best 
practice to prohibit gifts or hospitality that are 
disproportionate to the recipient’s income or 
those that are considered distasteful or could 
embarrass the company.
 (d) Monetary Caps—Generally, gifts or hospi-
tality should be modest and tasteful. The more 
extravagant or lavish the gift or hospitality, the 
more likely it will be viewed by government au-
thorities as improper. Companies should also 
keep in mind that the definition of “lavish” or 
“extravagant” will differ depending on the recipi-
ent. To limit the risk associated with the offering 
of gifts and hospitality, many government con-
tractors establish limits on the monetary value of 
gifts or hospitality that may be extended. Given 
the dramatic differences in applicable laws, con-
tractors have several options. Some may prohibit 
covered individuals from extending any gifts or 
hospitality without the prior, written approval of 
 Briefing Papers © 2014 by Thomson Reuters
★   JUNE    BRIEFING PAPERS    2014   ★
22
a designated approval authority224—regardless of 
dollar value. Other contractors may establish a 
variety of predetermined caps that apply depend-
ing on the situation. 
 For example, contractors that do business with 
the Federal Government may establish a cap 
consistent with the “20/50 rule.”225 Contractors 
should be careful, however, as the cap applies 
to the entire company, not individual employ-
ees. Consequently, additional controls must be 
established to ensure that a contractor does not 
inadvertently exceed the cap if gifts and hospital-
ity are extended to the same government official 
by multiple employees of the same company. In 
light of the risks associated with violations of 
the federal ethics regulations, many contractors 
simply prohibit the offering or giving of any gifts 
or hospitality to Federal Government officials.
 Contractors that do business with multiple state 
and local jurisdictions face a different problem: 
the incredibly diverse gift and hospitality laws 
applicable to state or local government officials. 
Indeed, a gift may be consistent with the laws of 
Washington, but run afoul of the laws of New 
Jersey. To be safe, it is advisable for companies to 
simply prohibit gifts or hospitality to state or lo-
cal government officials or require the advanced, 
written approval before any gifts or hospitality 
may be extended in these jurisdictions. 
 Although the gift and hospitality rules in for-
eign countries are often the most permissive, 
contractors should always research the laws of 
a particular jurisdiction before extending gifts 
to foreign government officials—regardless of 
local custom or practice. Failure to do so may 
not only result in a violation of local laws, but 
foreign anti-corruption laws, like the FCPA or 
UK Bribery Act.
 (e) Government Officials vs. Private Parties—Given 
the stringent laws that govern government officials’ 
acceptance of gifts and hospitality, it is critical that 
government contractors tailor their gift and hos-
pitality policies to this unique risk. In comparison, 
while there are risks associated with gift-giving and 
hospitality in the private sector, the rules are generally 
more permissive. Consequently, some contractors 
may create separate policies and procedures for the 
different recipients. Others may cover both regimes 
in the same policy, but tailor their policies to the 
most stringent regime. Still, other contractors may 
only have one policy, but create numerous differ-
ent rules and caps depending on the recipient of 
the gift or hospitality. Regardless of the approach, 
it is critical that policies address the unique risks 
associated with the offering of gifts and hospitality 
in the public sector and ensure covered individuals 
handle these transactions with care. 
 (f) Spouses, Relatives and Friends—Generally, 
policies should prohibit the offering of gifts or 
hospitality to the spouse, relatives, or other in-
dividuals close to the government official. While 
there may be rare instances in which it is appro-
priate to cover the expenses of these individuals, 
extending gifts or hospitality to the spouse or 
family member of a government official is often 
viewed as inappropriate by government enforce-
ment agencies as these expenditures rarely have 
a legitimate business purpose.226
 (g) Personal Funds—Policies must be clear that 
covered individuals may not use personal funds 
to extend gifts or hospitality that are prohibited 
by the company’s policy (regardless of whether 
reimbursement is sought). This is designed to 
ensure that individuals do not evade company 
policies by purchasing gifts and hospitality with 
their own money. 
 (h) Travel and Hospitality Expenditures for Govern-
ment Officials—Travel and hospitality expenditures 
for government officials present a unique compli-
ance risk—especially for contractors that must 
invite government officials to their facilities for 
inspections, tours or training, or even pursuant to 
the terms of a government contract. As such, travel 
and hospitality expenditures have provided fertile 
ground for government enforcement activity under 
the FCPA. This has resulted in significant liability for 
companies that have used the cover of a facility tour 
to disguise lavish trips and hospitality for govern-
ment officials.227 As a result, it is recommended that 
contractors craft and implement policies designed 
to ensure that these expenditures are modest and 
directly related to a legitimate business purpose. In 
addition, contractors should also consider imple-
menting these additional best practices:
(1) The company will only approve travel 
and hospitality expenditures that are 
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reasonable and necessary to educate the 
government official about the contrac-
tor’s business operations (or pursuant to 
a contract). Contractors should confirm in 
advance that the training or promotional 
events are genuine and fully document 
the activities. Under no circumstances 
should travel or hospitality be extended 
for reasons that are not directly related to 
business.
(2) The contractor should have no role in the 
selection of the particular government 
official that will travel—the decision must 
reside with the official’s agency. Contrac-
tors should also consider mandating the 
advanced, written approval of the ex-
penditures by the government official’s 
supervisor before approving the expenses 
internally. 
(3) All expenditures must be accurately 
recorded in the company’s books and 
records. Expenditures will not be reim-
bursed without proper documentation and 
preauthorization signatures. 
(4) All travel and hospitality expenditures 
should be paid directly to vendors that 
have been vetted in advance and provide 
the company with itemized statements. 
If this arrangement is not possible, reim-
bursement shall only be available if mod-
est and supported by itemized receipts. 
Furthermore, reimbursement should only 
be provided to the government official’s 
agency—not the government official. As 
a general rule, advancement of these ex-
penditures should not be extended. 
(5) Generally, transportation and lodging 
should be economy or business class. 
First-class travel and lodging expenditures 
should be prohibited. 
(6) The government officials should not be 
compensated for their visits. 
(7) Contractors should not pay for the travel or 
hospitality expenditures of a government 
official’s spouse, relatives, or significant 
others. 
(8) Entertainment or leisure activities (such 
as a sight-seeing tour) should be extremely 
modest or avoided. 
(9) Souvenirs should be of nominal value and 
contain the company logo.
(10) Overnight side trips should be prohibited.
 (i) Acceptance of Gifts—In addition to imple-
menting policies and procedures that address the 
giving of gifts and hospitality, contractors should 
maintain policies that address the acceptance 
of gifts and hospitality. Indeed, the failure to 
regulate and monitor these interactions could 
create significant liability under commercial 
bribery laws, among other criminal statutes.228 
Moreover, government contractors must be par-
ticularly careful given potential exposure under 
the Anti-Kickback Act, as the acceptance of gifts 
or hospitality from subcontractors or vendors 
could be viewed as a kickback.229 Indeed, the FAR 
also expressly requires contractors to maintain 
internal controls designed to detect and prevent 
kickbacks.230 Equally important, robust policies 
and internal controls will also detect and possi-
bly prevent other crimes that may be committed 
against the company by its employees, such as 
fraud or embezzlement. 
 Contractors will often set monetary thresholds 
for the acceptance of most categories of gifts 
and hospitality, while expressly prohibiting the 
most problematic categories of gifts and hospi-
tality, such as cash or cash equivalents, lavish or 
extravagant gifts or hospitality, or those gifts or 
hospitality that may be viewed as offensive and 
embarrassing. Moreover, many contractors will 
also implement more stringent requirements 
for individuals with procurement duties (i.e., 
individuals responsible for procuring goods and 
services on behalf of the company). Because 
companies want to ensure that the selection of 
vendors and subcontractors is based on criteria 
such as price and quality, not because the em-
ployee was influenced by gifts or hospitality, it is 
advisable to require employees with procurement 
duties to comply with more stringent standards. 
In fact, in light of the heightened risk associated 
with these employees, many contractors either 
implement an across-the-board prohibition on 
the acceptance of gifts and hospitality by these 
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employees or limit acceptance to logo items or 
gifts of de minimis value. 
 Companies should also consider offering 
guidance regarding how employees may politely 
refuse or return gifts or hospitality that run afoul 
of the policy. It is prudent to address this issue 
up front rather than leave employees to man-
age these challenging situations on their own. 
In addition, companies should consider clearly 
outlining procedures regarding the disposal of 
gifts that may not be returned, such as food or 
floral arrangements.
 ■ Approval Procedures & Internal Controls
 To ensure that covered individuals comply with the 
company’s gift and hospitality policies, contractors 
should also develop robust internal controls that 
establish approval processes, required documenta-
tion, and monitoring/oversight procedures. Not 
only do well-defined procedures help to identify red 
flags, such as improper expenditures or patterns of 
gift-giving, they also help the contractor to identify 
and remedy compliance failures. Similar to the 
policies mentioned above, the following procedures 
and internal controls will vary depending on the 
structure of the company and resources dedicated 
to compliance functions. 
 (a) Gift & Hospitality Request Form—Contrac-
tors should create a detailed approval process 
for requests to provide gifts or hospitality. At 
a minimum, the approval procedures should 
require requestors to complete a standard “gift 
and hospitality request” form that calls for, at a 
minimum, the following information: 
(1) The recipient’s name; 
(2) The recipient’s title and duties; 
(3) A description of pending or anticipated 
business with the recipient’s organization; 
(4) Any information that will shed light on 
the recipient’s ability to make decisions 
that will affect, positively or negatively, the 
contractor’s business; 
(5) The timing of the gift or hospitality (the 
closer to a contract award, the more likely 
it will be perceived as improper); 
(6) The nature and monetary value of the gift 
or hospitality; 
(7) For travel requests, the reason for the selec-
tion of the particular venue; 
(8) A detailed accounting of any other gifts or 
hospitality that may have been previously 
extended to the recipient; 
(9) The business purpose of the gift or hospi-
tality (including any information relating 
to contract requirements which may call 
for the travel or hospitality); and
(10) Any other relevant information relating to 
the proposed expenditures.
 In addition, the form should require the re-
quester to certify that the form is accurate and 
complete and should contain the signatures of 
the designated approval authority. Companies 
should consider requiring the prior, written 
approval of the designated approval authority 
before a gift or hospitality may be extended to 
a government official. In some instances, com-
panies will establish tiered approval authorities 
depending on the monetary value of the gift 
and recipient. 
 (b) Approval Authority—Designating an employee 
responsible for approving gift and hospitality 
requests may also be a challenge. Contractors 
with greater compliance resources will naturally 
designate the company compliance officer or a 
member of the company’s compliance staff to 
handle this process—often requiring a higher-
level of approval depending on the nature of 
the gift and/or the recipient. Other contractors 
may not have a designated compliance officer 
and will assign this responsibility to the general 
counsel or other legal staff. Regardless of the 
particular arrangement, it is critical that the ap-
proval authority be empowered to deny requests 
that are improper—even if it may result in the 
loss of business. 
 (c) Procedures To Address Red Flags—Identify-
ing gift and hospitality red flags is a critical 
component of an effective gift and hospitality 
policy. Identification, however, is just the first 
step. Companies must have procedures in place 
to ensure red flags are thoroughly investigated 
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and to prevent the company from violating ap-
plicable ethics or anti-corruption laws.231
 (d) Itemized Receipts Required—Many companies 
require requestors to provide itemized receipts 
and documentation demonstrating the prior, 
written approval of the gift or hospitality before 
they will reimburse any expenditures.
 (e) Recording in Books & Records—Companies 
should record all gifts and hospitality timely 
and accurately in their books and records, along 
with the following information (at a minimum) 
in reasonable detail: the date, name, title, and 
employer of the recipient, name and title of 
the individual extending the gifts or hospitality, 
description and monetary value of the gift or 
hospitality, and business purpose. 
 (f) Gift and Hospitality Database—Recording all 
gifts and hospitality in a database that is regularly 
monitored will ensure compliance with relevant 
laws and catch any unusual trends, such as wide-
spread patterns of gift-giving or hospitality to 
certain government officials. Similarly, an effective 
database will help companies to identify patterns 
in timing, including gifts or hospitality offered 
suspiciously close to a contract award or other 
activity that may affect the company’s business. 
 (g) Routine Audits—Companies should routinely 
audit gift and hospitality expenditures and proce-
dures to ensure compliance with applicable laws 
and policies and to identify weaknesses in internal 
controls. This includes audits of the gift and hos-
pitality database as well as the approval processes. 
In addition, internal auditors should “periodically 
review customer travel expenses, including adher-
ence to protocols, requisite approvals, side trips 
policies or reimbursement, extravagant entertain-
ment, and travel agency relationships.”232
 Policies and procedures are also likely to vary 
depending on the recipient of the gift. For ex-
ample, extending gifts and hospitality to private 
individuals may require less stringent protocols, 
though baseline internal controls must still 
be enforced to avoid triggering liability under 
commercial bribery and anti-kickback statutes. 
Similarly, procedures relating to the acceptance 
of gifts and hospitality may be decidedly less strin-
gent, though precautionary measures must be 
enforced—particularly with regard to employees 
with procurement duties.
 Most importantly, a company’s gift and hos-
pitality policies will only be as effective as the 
overarching compliance regime. Indeed, without 
a competent and independent compliance team, 
any gift or hospitality approval requirements will 
be meaningless.233 Consequently, it is critical that 
contractors take steps to implement other ethics 
and compliance best practices into their compli-
ance programs—instead of focusing on gifts and 
hospitality policies in a vacuum.
 ■ Supplemental Guidance & Training
 In addition to written policies, contractors 
should provide annual anti-corruption and com-
pliance training to covered individuals that are 
most likely to encounter issues relating to gifts 
and hospitality. While the training structure will 
vary depending on the make-up of the company 
and resources dedicated to compliance, at a 
minimum, employees most likely to encounter 
gift and hospitality issues should receive train-
ing, such as the sales team, financial officers, 
procurement professionals, internal auditors, ac-
counting personnel, individuals with supervisory 
or management duties, third parties, and any 
other individuals that interface with government 
officials. While live training is considered to be 
the gold standard, online training may also be 
effective if it is interactive, engaging, and provides 
trainees with opportunities to ask questions and 
receive additional guidance. 
 Training should, at a minimum, address the 
relevant ethics and anti-corruption laws and the 
company’s gift and hospitality policies and proce-
dures and provide trainees with guidance regard-
ing common scenarios that may trigger gift and 
hospitality concerns. Companies may also consider 
dividing employees into groups and offering separate 
training sessions tailored to the attendees’ duties, 
level of risk, interactions with government officials, 
procurement responsibilities, and supervisory or 
management roles. The training sessions will not 
only be instructive, but offer individuals a forum 
to ask questions and raise compliance concerns. 
 Contractors will also often issue supplemen-
tal guidance around the time of the holidays 
 Briefing Papers © 2014 by Thomson Reuters
★   JUNE    BRIEFING PAPERS    2014   ★
26
or other traditions that involve gift-giving. The 
supplemental guidance is designed not only to 
reinforce company policies, but to offer instruc-
tive advice relating to common gift-giving (or 
receiving) scenarios. Moreover, companies will 
also often provide guidance in advance of major 
sporting events, such as the Olympics or Super 
Bowl to reduce the corruption risks associated 
with these events.
 ■ Other Provisions
 A gift and hospitality policy should state 
clearly that all covered individuals must comply 
with the policies and procedures and outline 
the consequences for the failure to do so. Con-
sequences may include disciplinary action or 
even termination. The policy should also inform 
covered individuals that they have a duty to 
report any violations or suspected violations 
of the policy. 
 To ensure that individuals know where to obtain 
additional information or clarification regarding 
the policies and procedures, the policy should 
provide covered individuals with a point of con-
tact responsible for providing gift and hospitality 
guidance, including a confidential hotline or the 
company compliance officer. 
 Companies must keep in mind that the develop-
ment of compliance policies and procedures is an 
ongoing and iterative process. Companies should 
periodically review the effectiveness of policies and 
procedures and obtain feedback through regular 
training and internal monitoring.
GUIDELINES
   These Guidelines are intended to assist govern-
ment contractors in understanding and mitigat-
ing the risks of violating the complex laws, rules, 
and policies that restrict the offering or giving 
of gifts and hospitality to government officials. 
They are not, however, a substitute for profes-
sional representation in any specific situation.
 1. Recognize that gifts, hospitality, and other 
common business courtesies that are customary 
in the private sector may be improper or even 
illegal in the public sector. 
 2. Be aware that most jurisdictions, whether 
in the United States or abroad, have enacted 
laws or requirements that restrict the gifts and 
hospitality that government contractors may 
provide to government officials.
 3. Be cautious before offering a gift or hos-
pitality to a Federal Government official. The 
federal rules are very strict and a misstep could 
raise questions about a government contractor’s 
integrity and responsibility. 
 4. Bear in mind that in addition to adhering 
to monetary limits, contractors should not of-
fer gifts to a Federal Government employee so 
frequently that a reasonable person may believe 
that they are being offered for an improper pur-
pose. A contractor analyzing the frequency of its 
gift-giving should consider the following: if you 
saw a competitor doing this, would you think it 
was an attempt to obtain an unfair competitive 
advantage? If so, then the gift or hospitality should 
not be extended.
 5. Remember that if a gift or hospitality may 
not be provided directly to the government of-
ficial without violating the ethics restrictions, it 
may not be offered to or through another person 
or entity.
 6. Keep in mind that unlike the federal eth-
ics regime, many state and local ethics laws ap-
ply equally to government officials and outside 
sources, triggering significant consequences for 
both parties if the laws are violated.
 7. Recognize that state and local ethics laws 
vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction, rel-
evant government agency and government offi-
cial. Companies must always review all applicable 
laws before extending a gift to a state or local 
government official
 8. Remember that in addition to U.S. laws, 
contractors doing business abroad must also 
comply with the ethics and anti-corruption laws 
of the foreign country. Given the challenges 
contactors may face trying to locate and comply 
with these laws; many companies now hire local 
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counsel or utilize commercial services to assist 
them with this process.
 9. Bear in mind that many criminal bribery 
cases involve gifts and hospitality that could be 
viewed as a perfectly acceptable business cour-
tesy in the private sector. Anything viewed as 
valuable by the public official, whether tangible 
or intangible, could potentially trigger liability 
if viewed as an attempt to improperly influence 
a government official.
 10. Be aware that as countries around the world 
increasingly enforce their domestic and foreign 
anti-bribery laws, there has been an uptick in 
multi-jurisdictional prosecutions for the same 
or related conduct.
 11. Mitigate the risk of violating applicable 
ethics and anti-corruption laws through the imple-
mentation of a risk-based compliance program. 
Contractors should also implement robust gift 
and hospitality policies and procedures.
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